Introduction
Home mortgages may seem a rather pedestrian investment, but the mortgage fi nancing industry has reached a level of maturity and development worthy of the most sophisticated fi nancial engineer. Individual mortgages are bundled together and used as the collateral behind collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). CMOs are divided into tranches of various types, with names such as PACs, TACs, IOs, and sticky jump Zs. This proliferation segments the interest rate and pre-payment risk into different classes of instruments, creating a class of fairly safe assets with wide appeal. This of course also creates a class of risky assets, known collectively as toxic waste. 1 To what extent is this toxic waste a problem? Held as a hedge, or by well-capitalized investors who understand the risk, it is not a concern. Held by unsophisticated investors who do not understand their exposure, or by institutions arbitraging regulatory requirements, it may be a problem.
Unfortunately, the extent of the possible problem has received little attention, either in the academic literature or the popular press. 2 Information on the total amount of risky CMO constructs is diffi cult to come by, and public information about the concentration and eventual disposition of those assets is almost non-existent. In this paper we take a fi rst look at this aspect of the market, endeavoring to ascertain which portfolios hold risky CMO debt and the extent to which it poses a problem for investors and regulators.
In the next section we develop a simple pricing model that illustrates how the value of CMO constructs can change dramatically with interest rates. Then we examine the available data on the size and distribution of risky CMOs. Finally, we take a closer look at CMO holdings at commercial banks, a sector for which there is more detailed information and potentially greater regulatory concern.
The Risk in CMOs
Before attempting to track the ownership of risky CMO tranches, we present some examples illustrating the potential risks. Default risk generally is minimal, since most issuers either provide a guarantee of over-collateralize the CMO. The interest rate risk, on the other hand, can be enormous, particularly as there can be very complicated prepayment effects.
We construct a Monte Carlo model of stochastic interest rates and mortgage cash fl ows, and use it to illustrate the risk in the value of several common types of mortgage derivatives-Zs, IOs and POs. We consider the risks in a variety of interest rate environments, including one of rapidly rising interest rates. To preview the main results, we fi nd that under conditions of typical interest rate volatility, the value of these derivatives is highly volatile. For instance, there is a signifi cant probability that losses on toxic waste holdings will exceed the associated bank capital requirements, even with a 100 percent 1. See Haubrich (1995) for a basic introduction to CMO derivatives and Midanek (1995) for a history of the market. A detailed, but still high-level description of mortgage derivatives can be found in Oldfi eld (2000) .
2. While there is also concern about the risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and their holdings of toxic waste are an aspect of their risk, our focus is on the pass-through risk to other institutions.
2 risk weight. We also fi nd that the effect of an unanticipated and unusually rapid increase in mortgage rates would be to increase the value of some types of derivatives (IOs), and decrease the value of others (Zs and POs).
Some Illustrations
In the model, stochastic interest rates induce stochastic prepayment rates, and hence variability in the timing, amount and present value of cash fl ows. More precisely, mortgage interest rates are assumed to follow a discretized Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) process, with monthly shocks to annual rates described by:
( The speed of mean reversion is from Tuckman (1995) . The assumed long-run rate is lower than the average mortgage rate since 1990 of 7.7 percent, implicitly putting more weight on more recent conditions.
The prepayment rate 4 (PSA) varies inversely with the distance between current mortgage rates as given by equation ( The cash fl ows for a given derivative security over its life are determined according to the rules for that security and the cash fl ows the underlying 30-year fi xed-rate mortgage pool. In the case of Zs, no cash is received until all other classes of security holders are repaid in full. Deferred coupons are invested at the current monthly rate implied by the model, and paid out in full at the time of the fi rst principal repayment to the Z class. Z's are assumed to comprise 10 percent of principal. IOs receive all coupon payments as 3. This is derived from a monthly volatility of 1 percent, adjusted for the square root of the interest rate in the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) formulation: they arrive, and POs receive all principal payments. Cash fl ows are discounted at the realized mortgage rates along each Monte Carlo path. 6 A histogram of the distribution of the present value of a Z residual, based on 2000
Monte Carlo runs and normalized by the average present value, is given in fi gure 1. The mean value is normalized to 1, and the coeffi cient of variation is 25 percent. However, the asymmetric distribution of the risk reduces the informativeness of variance-based measures of spread. In fact, if Zs are priced at their expected value, most of the time the investment will generate a sizable profi t (the mode in fi gure 1 is well above the mean).
The long lower tail, however, indicates that there is a risk of signifi cant losses. butions equal 1; the coeffi cient of variation for the IO is 47.7 percent and 21 percent for the IO and PO, respectively. The very high risk of the IO is due to the disappearance of cash fl ows in the event of prepayments (whereas for the PO prepayment only affects the timing of the cash fl ows). Unlike Zs and POs, however, IOs have positive skewness
Losses and Bank Capital Requirements
As discussed below in the section on CMO holdings at commercial banks (Bank Risk), the rules governing the capital held against these securities by commercial banks are complicated. It is reasonable to assume that for many banks, particularly the smaller ones, toxic waste will be assigned a risk weight of 1, with a corresponding 8 percent capital requirement.
Under the base case assumptions, the Monte Carlo results suggest that an 8 percent capital requirement for these securities is often inadequate. For the Zs, losses exceed required capital 27.3 percent of the time; for the IOs, losses exceed capital a striking 54.8 percent of the time; and for POs losses exceed capital 24.9 percent of the time.
Larger banks may hold capital based on the more complicated rules for measuring market risk, although they may also follow the 8 percent rule if the securities are not held in a trading account. The market risk rule is based on value at risk (VaR) for a 10-day period and a 99 percent confi dence level. Assessing the VaR for these securities is tricky. If historical price data were available (which it is not), it could be used to create a probability distribution of conditional price changes. The model used in the Monte Carlo experiments provides the conditional distribution of future interest rate and cash fl ow paths from a given starting point. How should this be used this to represent the distribution of changes in expectation over 10 days about the entire future path of cash fl ows and their present value?
The approach taken here is to compare the average present value of cash fl ows at the initial interest rate with the average present value for an adverse change in interest rates at the 99 percent level over 10 days. The 99 percent confi dence interval for interest rates in the model, centered on the initial value of 0.045, is (0.0356, 0.0544). An adverse change for the IOs implies that rates fall to 0.0356, while for POs and Zs it implies that rates rise to 0.0544. For IOs, the VaR is 17.7 percent of the original price, for POs it is 8.8 percent of the original price, and for Zs it is 6.5 percent of the original price. Multiplying each by the factor of 3.5 implies a capital requirement far in excess of the 8 percent required for smaller institutions. To the extent that bank portfolios contain securities whose risk fully or partially offsets (for example, an IO plus a PO has risk identical to a whole mortgage), evaluating capital adequacy one security at a time overstates the risk.
Rapidly Rising Rates
Given the low interest rate environment of recent years and the expectation that rates could rise sharply, it is interesting to ask what would happen to the value of toxic waste if those expectations were realized or exceeded. As a test of this, we assume that the path of interest rates over 14 months follows the pattern of rates from October of 1993 to December of 1994. At that time, interest rates rose abruptly after a long period of gradual decline, climbing a total of 2.37 percent. The episode revealed the vulnerabil- To reproduce the 1994 experience, we assume those historical rate changes for the fi rst 14 months of the simulations, with stochastic rates and their corresponding prepayment rates simulated in the Monte Carlo thereafter. We assume that security prices start at the average value predicted by the base case model, and that rates initially are at 4.5 percent. We then calculate the percentage change in the value of each security at the end of 14 months, assuming payments received along the way are reinvested and rolled over at current rates. For Zs, the average present value falls to 91.3 percent of the base case starting value. The average present value of POs falls to 94.7 percent of the base case starting value. IOs, on the other hand, signifi cantly increase in value, to 179.5 percent of the base case. While these price changes are unlikely to threaten the viability of well-capitalized banks, they could have a signifi cant adverse affect on poorly capitalized institutions with concentrated positions in these securities.
It is possible that the market is already pricing a more rapid increase in interest rates into mortgage derivatives than in the base case model. If so, the above calculations exaggerate the gains or losses likely to be realized. An alternative that takes this into account is to assume a more rapid rate of mean reversion to the long-run 7 percent rate than in the base case. To implement this, we recalculate the distribution of present values under the assumption that s, the mean reversion parameter, increases by a factor of 10 (going from 0.025 to 0.25 on an annual basis). This implies that rates on average are expected to rise by about 1 percent in the fi rst two years the mortgages are outstanding, roughly consistent with implied forward rates. All other parameters are as before.
Figures 4 to 6 illustrate the effect of faster mean reversion in rates on the distribution of present values. For the Zs, the average present value falls to 97.5 percent of the original base case. The value is depressed due to slower repayments as rates rise, and payments discounted at a higher average rate. For the IOs, value increases to 116 percent of the original base case. The dominant effect causing IO value to rise is that slower prepayments result in more coupon payments being received. For the POs, value decreases on average to 96.6 percent of the base case, as principal is returned more slowly and discounted at higher average rates. 
How Much Toxic Waste?
Of the CMO/REMICs out there, how much is extremely risky and should count as toxic waste? This is a diffi cult question to answer. The mortgage debt outstanding number is a stock measure, and as such it combines securities issued in many different years. Furthermore, a major characteristic of CMOs is that tranches may be of short or variable duration. To our knowledge, there is no accurate aggregate estimate of the number or value of outstanding tranches. There is somewhat more information on the fl ow variable, CMO issuance. Figures 7 and 8 plot the time series fl ow of total toxic waste value and toxic waste value as a fraction of total value from Bloomberg. One possible concern about our measure is that it on occasion exceeds 50 percent. Can there be that many highly risky CMO constructs? As it turns out, for the three months where the fraction exceeds one-third, in two of them (May 1995 and October 1999 ) the high number results from components about which we have the most confi dence that they are risky: Zs and Subs. Usually, these are much lower; the median of their sum is only 4 percent. In the other (July 1996) the cause was a high level of IO/POs, which also are generally regarded as high risk.
Another source on the extent of toxic waste arises from regulatory concern about the risk in bank portfolios. In 1992, the Federal Reserve Board issued a Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities that defi ned the "high-risk mortgage securities" deemed unsuitable investments for banks. This became known as the FFIEC test, and CMO bonds that passed (deemed not high risk) became known as FFIEC-qualifi ed. Those deemed high risk had to be carried in the institution's trading account or as assets held for sale. In practice, a mortgage-derivative product that met any of the following three criteria was deemed high risk:
• Average Life Test: expected weighted average life greater than 10.0 years
• Average Life Sensitivity Test: expected weighted average life extends by more 4.0 years if the yield curve shifts up 300 basis points or shortens by more the 6.0 years if the yield curve shifts down 300 basis points (both shifts sustained and parallel).
• Price Sensitivity Test: the estimated change in the price of the security exceeds 17 percent with a shift in the yield curve of 300 basis points. This regulation also led to a revision of the FFIEC Call Reports, having banks report the amount of high risk mortgage securities they held. In April 1998, the constraints were rescinded, and shortly thereafter banks stopped reporting. 
Who Holds CMOs and Their Constructs?
Who holds the risky CMO constructs-the exotic tranches, the toxic waste? That question is not so easy to answer. Anecdotally, much goes to private partnerships and hedge funds, entities with little regulation a few reporting requirements (Passmore, et al., 2002) .
A preliminary step is to establish which investors hold CMOs in their portfolios, though the distribution of risky CMO constructs may differ. Furthermore, concentration matters: a sector's aggregate holdings may be low, but that does not preclude an unhealthy concentration in a few fi rms. (Knowles, 1993) .
Banks
Banks hold many CMOs, and this raises two concerns. First, under current capital requirements, it may be advantageous to hold the riskier forms of any given asset class to increase return on equity. Secondly, the expense of bank failures may be borne by the pub- Bank Risk
Bank capital requirements are designed to differentiate between different instruments according to risk and, to a large extent, are directed at credit rather than interest rate risk.
Accordingly, for risk-based capital purposes, any sort of mortgage-backed security falls into one of several broad categories. Agency CMOs get generally favorable treatment. Securities backed by Ginne Mae, Freddie, and Fannie get a 20 percent weight (though passthroughs from Ginnie get a zero weight). Privately-issued CMOs have a weight dependent on the weights of the underlying assets, and thus often get a risk weight of 50 or 100 percent. Instruments viewed as risky, such as strips, get a 100 percent weight. The criterion for a 100 percent weighting is "any class of an MBS that can absorb more than its pro rata share of loss without the whole issue being in default" 8
While the most obvious form of regulatory arbitrage may be banks amassing risky CMO constructs, which, for some reason, get a 20 percent weight, that is not the only possibility. Roughly speaking, banks must hold eight percent capital against their riskweighted assets. As shown above, it is entirely possible that eight percent capital is not enough, given the risk of some CMO constructs. Thus, even with a 100 percent risk weighting, holding some CMOs may constitute regulatory arbitrage.
Since 1998 however, there has been another capital requirement on market risk for banks with large trading activity. These banks must increase their credit-risk-weighted assets by a "market-risk-equivalent" factor based on the value at risk (VaR) of the bank's trading account (and commodity position). 9
In organizing the data on bank CMO holdings, we take two approaches The portfolios with a high concentration of CMOs are rarely large in an absolute sense:
Only one bank in tables 6 and 7 is among the top-ten CMO holders for the quarter. But the concentration seems quite impressive. Table 9 lists the ten banks with the largest ratio of risky CMOs to total assets. Southside and Compass stand out as banks with a position in risky CMOs that is large both absolutely and relative to their assets.
One thing to notice in table 9 is the relatively quick drop-off in holding concentration.
Few banks hold much more than 10 percent of their assets as risky CMOs. The top banks show surprisingly high concentrations, though. In eight of sixteen quarters for which we have these data, at least one bank is holding more than one-quarter of its total assets as risky CMOs. The peak is nearly 43 percent. Possibly, these are just special-purpose vehicles and not "real banks." If they are conduits for mortgage fi rms or securitization, there may be less of a problem, if management knows the relevant risks.
Tobits
Which factors lead a bank to invest in CMOs? As a natural beginning to answering this question, we conduct a Tobit analysis. The procedure controls for zero holdings and includes standard control variables in addition to variables related to risk, such as the capital ratio, net interest margin, and charge-offs. The full set of variables is listed in table 10.
The idea is to test the hypothesis that riskier banks have a higher propensity to hold risky CMOs (as a share of assets). Table 11 reports the results for the period where we have the most detailed data (1994:Q1 to 1998:Q4) . Notice that most coeffi cients are highly signifi cant. The size dummies are mostly signifi cant and positive. Since the excluded group is banks with total assets above $5 billion, this result indicates that smaller banks tend to hold more CMOs as a fraction of total assets, the exception being the smallest banks with assets below $50 million. The charge-off ratio enters negatively, which suggests that banks investing in risky
CMOs are not particularly risky on other dimensions.
The capital ratio has a negative coeffi cient, suggesting that a higher capital ratio implies lower holdings of CMOs. This is consistent with the story that some CMO holdings might be for gaming capital regulations. However, the effect is rather small. Increasing the capital ratio of the bank by one percentage point (say from 8 percent to 9 percent)
should decrease the percentage of CMOs in the bank's portfolio by 0.03 percent (see Maddala, 1983, section 6.6). Since a big change in bank capital of 3 percent would decrease the risky CMO percentage by only one-tenth of one percent, this does not appear to be highly important.
Conclusion
Although we fi nd no smoking gun in call report data, CMO constructs can be dangerous. That became obvious ex post when interest rates rose dramatically in 1994. Then, the losses from CMO constructs made the headlines, with multimillion-dollar losses at Askin Capital Management, Piper Jaffray, the Louisiana State Retirement Plan and Yamachi Securities, among others (Canadian Institute of Actuaries, 1996) . Unfortunately, the institutions that have assumed this risk in recent years are opaque, and it is impossible to determine whether and where there are concentrated exposures. At a time when interest rates are again rising, understanding who is exposed to such risk is a question investors-and taxpayers-should ponder.
